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Abstract— In this paper we investigate several potential 
hardware features from multiple devices for suitability during 
the employment of a device identification. The generation of 
stable and unique digital identity from features is challenging 
in device identification because of the unstable operation 
environments that implies the features employed are likely to 
vary under normal operating conditions. To address this, we 
introduce a novel multi-dimensional key generation technology 
which maps from multi-dimensional feature space directly to a 
key space. Furthermore, normalized distributions of features 
give the necessary data to model the characteristics, from 
which we derive intra-sample device feature distributions, and 
correlate the distinct features to generate a secure key to 
identify the device.  
 
Keywords—Security, ICMetric ,Authentication ,Key 
generation,Multidimensional space. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In common cybersecurity parlance, the importance of 
strong authentication is more than ever before. Regulatory 
requirements, such as EU eIDAS, are also mandate robust 
authentication. Cybercrime cost the global economy as 
much as $600 billion in 2017 and a significant part of these 
attacks are related to weak authentication in one way or the 
other [16]. Under the current circumstances, traditional 
approaches like hardware tokens are expensive to deploy 
and manage and are ineffective against some threats [16]. 
The challenge we face is deploying a technology that is both 
easy to use yet strong enough to protect against 
sophisticated attacks like malware, Man-in-the-Middle etc. 
ICMetrics is a secure software credential that combines 
protection for digital identities like that of a hardware smart 
card with ease of use, ease of distribution, and lower costs 
for deployment and maintenance. The ICMetrics is the 
‘something you have’ and ICMetrics password (optional) is 
the ‘something you know’ necessary for two-factor 
authentication. As a software-based solution, the ICMetrics 
enables organizations to leverage the advantages of Public-
Key Infrastructures (PKI) without the expense and 
management issues inherent with hardware-based secure key 
storage. ICMetrics can also operate and offer similar level of 
security in a non-PKI mode as well [3]. 
ICMetrics is a unique technology for deriving private keys 
based on the digital fingerprint (software and hardware 
configurations) of the device [2]. The novelty of the 
proposed system is that the measured characteristics need 
not remain absolutely constant but can fluctuate within a 
(configurable) defined range, thus allowing the software to 
operate in several different states whilst still ensuring that 
any illegal clone or malware attack is detected [1]. Such a 
system will offer the following significant advantages: 1) 
Eliminate the need to store any credential related sensitive 
data within the device, hence addressing the major weakness 
which can be used to circumvent the security offered by the 
system. 2) In a malware attack, ICMetrics behaviour 
analysis helps to detect tampering with the constitution of a 
software will cease authentication process. The novelty of 
the proposed system is that the measured characteristics 
need not remain absolutely constant but can fluctuate within 
a (configurable) defined range, thus allowing the software to 
operate in several different states whilst still ensuring that 
any illegal clone or malware attack is detected. 
ICMetrics is defined as a two-step process [4]: 
Calibration Phase 
1. For all the devices or services, measure desired 
feature values that characterize the device or service. 
2. Generate feature distributions for each feature 
illustrating the frequency of each occurrence of each 
discrete value for each sample device. This will 
allow the same digital signature to be generated 
from the normal variations of operation of the 
device concerned but ensure any abnormal variation 
fails to generate the correct digital signature. 
3. Normalize the feature distributions generating   
normalization maps for each feature. These 
essentially relate the range of measured values for a 
given device to a fixed range of values chosen for 
that particular device feature. The absolute values of 
features are thus discarded and abstract virtual 
values are chosen in their place. 
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Operation Phase 
1. Measure desired systems features. 
2. Apply the normalization maps to generate values 
suitable for key generation.  
3. Apply the key generation algorithm to combine the 
normalised feature values into a single key. 
The focus of this paper is to evaluate the feasibility of 
generating encryption key based on hardware features 
derived from the properties and behaviour of general-
purpose computing devices [7]. In order to achieve this, we 
first investigate appropriate method of extracting hardware 
features and explore potential features that are suitable for 
key generation. Then, we evaluated a new multidimensional 
encryption key generation algorithm. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we 
describe criteria of ICMetrics features then we have used to 
extract feature values. Then, we explain the analysis of the 
data we have performed and provide interpretation of the 
results. Finally, we summarise the paper with some 
suggestions for future work. 
II.  CRITERIA 
The properties of ICMetrics features have been explored 
and the following properties are desirable to identify the 
device uniquely: 
1) The first is the data should correlate to each other 
because correlated features improve the robustness of the 
system and raise the feasibility of raw feature data. 
2) The second desirable property of a feature is a low 
intra-sample variation. The more a feature value can 
vary, the harder the value is to map and the less stable 
the value is when contributing to key generation. 
3) The final aspect of a feature to consider is inter-
sample variation. This determines a feature’s entropy 
and the larger the inter-sample variation, the larger the 
entropy. In other words, the derived key should have a 
property with low intra-sample variance (i.e. the values 
produced for the same device) but high intersample 
variance (i.e. the values produced for the different 
devices) with an ideal case being no inter-sample overlap 
of potential features.  
These criteria for features are needed holistically in the 
multidimensional space including correlations. Next, the 
combination of the data needs to present a certain amount of 
discrimination in a multi-dimensional space, which means it 
should as less overlap as possible in the multi-dimensional 
space. Finally, we evaluated normalization and quantization 
of the feature values. Overall, this paper outlines the method 
of analysis and mathematical implementation in 
multidimensional space. In our future work will focus on 
developing a new binary key mapping algorithm to map a 
measured data from multi-dimensional space to a key vector 
and implement Shamir’s Secret Sharing to increase the 
entropy of the system [10]. 
III. FEATURE EXTRACTION 
We evaluated some of the potential hardware 
performance features read by the MacBook Air, and 
identified the useful ones. In order to collect data each 
device runs an algorithm to find features that can provide an 
adequate dynamic range, obfuscation and variance. By 
default, features collected by devices are grouped into 3 
main categories. These are CPU-related values like the 
performance of floating-point arithmetic, memory-related 
features like time taken to read memory, & hard disk-related 
features like the CPU usage when writing to disk. Also, we 
analyse the correlation between features and used as new 
features. In this paper, we investigated hardware features as 
a potential ICMetrics features. Each feature was collected 
1000 times since it is sufficient to determine the probability 
distributions. Also, please note that this is the calibration 
phase and not that we need to capture 1000 samples to 
rebuild the key which would make the system infeasible. 
IV. MAPPING METHODOLOGY 
This section introduces the algorithm for generating an 
encryption key which has the following four example 
features related to hard disk like the CPU usage when 
writing to disk. To generate an encryption key, it is 
necessary to develop suitable methods for combining 
selected features to produce unique basis number - an initial 
binary number unique to the devices from which actual 
encryption keys may be derived [6][7]. This basis number 
can then be used to generate encryption keys, for device 
authentication. 
In order to increase this entropy, feature values from 
multiple features should be combined in order to produce a 
long basis number [9]. Feature values can be generated from 
both static and dynamic features (where the value may 
legitimately vary for a given device) but the process of 
doing so varies for each type. Since static features do not 
change with time, the measured value of the static feature 
can be used directly, since it is likely to remain the same 
each time it is sampled. This approach will not work for 
dynamic features, however, since it is likely that each time 
the feature is sampled, the feature will hold a different value. 
Instead, it is necessary to take many measurements of the 
feature, quantize the measured values into discrete values, 
and generate a frequency distribution for that feature. 
A. Feature Combination 
Once feature values have been generated for all device 
features, it is necessary to combine them in such a way that 
they produce a suitably long basis number, with sufficient 
entropy to be used for key generation, and that is stable 
enough that it can be reliably reproduced. In other words, let 
us assume we take four feature set each feature set has four 
features each. We get a stable basis number from each of the 
four feature sets. Then we simply concatenate all the basis 
numbers to get a final basis number. Our approach to 
produce the stable basis number suppose we have four 
features (F1, F2, F3, F4) and each feature has n samples. We 
then add four sets of samples and get F5. We then take 20 
random samples and calculate the average, take log value of 
the average and this log value is the base number. We repeat 
this process with another set of 20 random samples and 
derive the basis number. After repeating this process several 
hundred times, we then figure out whether all the basis 
numbers are same or not – if they are same, it is a stable 
basis number. Our results for these example features 
produced stable basis number for key generation. 
B. Feature Quantization and Normalization 
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This system works in two phase process, first analyzing 
feature values for devices to produce a normalization map 
for the feature and subsequently employing the 
normalization maps to produce a code for identifying 
devices in multidimensional space. The basic concept of the 
normalization map is to map a measured series of feature 
data into a multidimensional space. In our previous work 
[11], normalization maps are linear based, mapping each 
individual feature to a vector and concatenating them 
together. The traditional strategy for generating an 
encryption key from a given feature distribution may 
involve quantizing the distribution into fixed subsets with 
each value within a given subset mapping to a single value. 
The goal of quantization is to normalize feature data, so the 
best quantization interval should exhibit the biggest inter 
sample variance between devices. 
C.  Multimodal distributions 
After quantization and normalization, the next step is to 
establish the form of the probability distribution, for 
example Gaussian, bimodal or multimodal in nature. It is 
possible that a set of data from a particular feature is mostly 
multimodal in nature, making it difficult to generate a basis 
number. Feature values that are multi-modal in distribution 
require careful consideration with regards to generating a 
stable key [9]. Before employing any mapping algorithm, bit 
manipulation on the feature involves a number of binary 
operations on the feature bytes. One solution to this problem 
is to divide the distribution into a series of Gaussian 
distributions, where each mode on the original distribution 
becomes the mode of its own Gaussian distribution. A 
simple approach to this problem is to apply a peak trough 
detection algorithm to the distribution, where the troughs 
split the multimodal distribution into separate Gaussian 
distributions with the peaks forming the modes [16]. Fig.1 
shows the distributions of the four example features related 
to hard disk like the CPU usage when writing to disk for 
device 1 F1 & F2 shows multimodal distribution, and F3 
&F4 shows Gaussian distribution and Table I shows the 
modes after applying peak-trough algorithm. 
 
 
(a) Shows Gaussian Distribution 
 
(b) Shows Multimodal Distribution 
 
 
(c) Shows Bimodal Distribution 
 
 
(d) Shows Gaussian Distribution 
 
Fig. 1. Distributions of the four different features. The vertical axis is the 
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TABLE I. MODES OF THE FOUR DIFFERENT FEATURES 




































V. EXPERIMENT & RESULTS 
The experimental environment platform for extraction of 
the features consists of a number of stages: (1) A Software 
Application (2) Logging Feature Values for additional 
analysis required for ICMetrics. The implementation is 
described in the following subsections. 
A. Software Application 
The experimental platform for extracting ICMetrics features 
is iOS running on the MacBook Air. Data is collected from 
the hardware features (Memory, CPU) such as sequential 
output (block), MFlops, random Seeks etc –these features on 
macbook have not been investigated previously. For this 
research, we have employed: 
 XCODE (iOS Developer Tools) build Version 8.2.1 
(8C1002) including Interface Builder and an 
application used to construct graphical user 
interface. 
 Three MacBook Air. 
 Data collected from the general-purpose computing 
devices. 
 Python Code and Microsoft Excel used for data 
analysis. 
The method for collecting the feature values must be 
controlled such that we can determine what causes the 
features to behave as they do during the analysis. The 
sample values output for analysis have a timestamp to 
determine the fluctuation in feature values. This is to allow 
conclusions to be drawn between the presence of 
background processes for a system resource and the 
influence they can have on the various candidate features 
being analyzed hence it is not only system processes that 
could potentially affect low-level hardware feature values. 
User-controlled processes could also alter the distribution of 
a feature. To assist with this challenge, the status of the 
device is monitored and recorded when samples are read for 
analysis. This information can be very useful when 
developing mapping functions for feature values, and one 
reason why it is a good idea to run feature collection over a 
long period of time. When values of interest are found to 
have an effect on other feature values, it presents the 
opportunity to use these internal relationships or feature 
correlations, as a first-class feature. These features generally 
offer more natural obfuscation and are found to be more 
reliable than individual features, so it is common they make 
strong candidate features for employing in an ICMetric 
system. 
In this analysis we have different devices, first we 
calculate frequency distribution of all devices and then we 
apply a peak-trough detection algorithm to the distribution. 
Here the peak-troughs split the multimodal distribution into 
separate Gaussian distributions with the peaks forming the 
modes and then we use multivariate normal probability 
density function to calculate the probability of the sample 
associated with that mode [12]. In our experiment, the 
features from all devices have Gaussian and multimodal 
distribution. For calculating the probability, we take the 
samples from each server, calculate the mean and covariance 
of the modes within the distribution of the current devices. 
For example, if the device has bimodal distribution then we 
have two modes and each mode have its own mean and 
covariance. For this, first we determine in which mode the 
current sample falls into and then we calculate the 
probability of the sample and repeat the same process for 
other modes. We then take same sample from another device 
and see if that sample from other device lies in which mode 
of first device and then we calculate the probability of the 
sample. If the probability from second device is low as 
compare to first device, that means first device is correctly 
identified based on probability and we repeat the same 
process for’ n’ devices. After that we look for the 
boundaries in the 4d space to locate which area in space 
belongs to which device and then we write a mapping 
function to identify the devices area correctly in space. We 
observed that the training data and testing data differentiated 
between devices are quite promising. In some cases, we got 
97% and above correct results. 
B. Correlation of Features 
Correlated features are more desirable than singular 
features because the correlated features are likely to be more 
stable than the singular features as they represent a 
relationship rather than a specific range, such that there is 
less intra-sample variance thus increasing reproducibility of 
the generated key. In other words, in a given device, a non-
correlated feature could have any range of values but the 
relationship between two tends to be more stable as indicate 
by the correlation. Another significant aspect of correlated 
features is their ability to help distinguish devices. Singular 
features have a higher change of having an overlap when the 
possible range for the feature is analyzed across multiple 
devices. Singular features are features that are measured 
directly from the device rather than being derived. 
Correlated features add an extra step when trying to recreate 
the values, as the correlated values must be generated and 
cannot be read directly from a device. Importantly, each 
correlated feature can itself be used as a feature, which has 
the benefit of increasing the entropy of the key generated by 
the ICMetrics algorithm [13]. For instance, Table II shows 
the correlation of the same features combinations from 
different devices. The correlation of F1-F2 from device1 is 
0.964728227 and the correlation of device2 is 0.738532807. 
This shows a great difference between Device1 and 
Device2. Although the coefficient of Devuce3 is 
0.982909775, which it shows a small difference compared to 
Device1, but it still distinguishable. For F2-F4, Device1 and 
Device2 show similarity. Device3 shows enormous disparity 
between Device1 and Device2. In this case, Device3 is 
distinguishable, but Device1 and Device2 are quite close. In 
this situation, we can still distinguish them according to the 
Pearson correlation distribution. 
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TABLE II. CORRELATION OF FEATURES 
 
 
Finally, the features of a device can be logically 
categorized into specific sets, which we call mini-ICMetrics. 
Each set contains features, which share similar traits or are 
affected by the same modifications of a device. The creation 
of the mini-ICMetrics feature sets allows for fault tolerance 
system to be implemented into the ICMetrics key generation 
process by employing them as points on a polynomial 
combined via Shamir Secret Sharing Algorithm [10]. This 
fault tolerance is achieved by using Shamir’s Secret Sharing 
cryptographic algorithm to allow a fixed minimum number 
of shares mini-ICMetrics to be required to produce the same 
key. In this case, a mini-ICMetrics is created for each 
category used in the key generation process. The number of 
correct categories required to reconstruct the key can be 
defined in the algorithm, thus allowing that the robustness 
and entropy of the key and can be adjusted as required for 
the specific the circumstances. The incorporation of this 
enhancement introduces robustness with the key generation 
process by allowing a pre-defined number of feature sets to 
generate the correct component ICMetric value, defining the 
number of sets required as the error tolerance value. Thus, if 
the tolerance number of sets is not reached, the system fails, 
not meeting the secret sharing reconstruction threshold and a 
different key will be produced and measures to protect the 
data would be taken. Conversely, if the number of categories 
that was correct was greater than or equal to the tolerance, 
the system would produce the correct ICMetric key and a 
practical system could be implemented to adapt to the 
changes in the failed categories so that they could become 
part of the accepted range for the features in that category, 
where that is desirable in order to deal with acceptable 
changes in the system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the hardware data as an 
ICMetrics feature and investigated how the number of 
samples of the feature values being employed affects the 
ICMetrics system’s performance. We observed that data 
differentiated between devices quite nicely, however the 
total entropy using these features was not as strong as 
current encryption keys so to increase strength of encryption 
key, we could use additional hardware features. 
Overall, this paper outlines the method of analysis and 
mathematical implementation in multidimensional space. In 
our future work will focus on developing a new binary key 
mapping algorithm to map a measured data from multi-
dimensional space to a key vector and implement Shamir’s 
Secret Sharing to increase the entropy of the system. 
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